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Post Keynesian Economics (PKE) is at a cross road. Post Keynesians (PKs) have become 
effectively marginalized; the academic climate at universities has become more hostile to 
survival and the mainstream has become more diverse internally. Moreover, a heterodox 
camp of diverse groups of non-mainstream economists is forming. The debate on the future of 
PKE has so far focussed on the relation to the mainstream. This paper argues that this is, in 
fact, not an important issue for the future of PKE. The debate has so far strangely overlooked 
the dialectics between academic hegemony and economic (and social) stability. In times of 
crisis the dominant economic paradigm becomes vulnerable, which opens possibilities for 
heterodox streams. The important question is, whether PKE offers useful explanations of 
ongoing socio-economic transformation. PKE has generated valuable insights on core areas 
such as monetary macroeconomics and medium-term growth theory, but it offers little on 
important real world phenomena such as supply-side phenomena like the increasing use of 
ICT and the globalisation of production, social issues like precarisation and the polarization of 
income distribution or ecological challenges like climate change. It is these issues that will 
decide the future of PKE.  
 
 
Keywords: Post Keynesian economics; mainstream economics, heterodox economics, 
neoliberalism 
 
JEL code: B20, B50, B59, E12 
  1 
1. Introduction 
 
Post Keynesian Economics (PKE) is at a cross road. While Post Keynesians (PKs) have 
established their niche, they have become marginalized and are effectively ignored by the 
mainstream. At the same time new challenges have arisen. The academic climate at 
universities has become more hostile to survival with research assessments and journal ratings 
degrading their work. The mainstream has become more diverse internally. A heterodox camp 
of diverse groups of non-mainstream economists is forming.  
 
How should PKE deal with these challenges? Fontana and Gerard (2006) argue that many 
PKs lack sufficient knowledge of mainstream economics and that it is vital that PKs enter a 
dialogue with the mainstream. Addressing the question of the relation of the mainstream and 
heterodox economics more generally, Colander et al. 2004 have argued that the mainstream is 
in a process of transition to a new orthodoxy that is based on a post-Walrasian revolution in 
microeconomics. The new mainstream would be open to consider all arguments provided they 
a presented in a formalized way. These claims have been critiqued by Dutt (2005) and King 
(2008), who question that post-Walrasian microeconomics is becoming a new mainstream and 
argue that macroeconomics has become more rather than less orthodox.  
 
This paper argues that the debate on how PKE relates to the mainstream is, in fact, not an 
important issue for the future of PKE. The debate has so far strangely overlooked the 
dialectics between academic hegemony and economic (and social) stability. In times of crisis 
the dominant economic paradigm becomes vulnerable, which opens possibilities for 
heterodox streams. The hegemony of the mainstream will thus crucially depend on the 
viability of the socio-economic regime. In order to formulate a strategy for PKE to move 
forward the paper investigates changes in the regime of accumulation, developments within 
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the mainstream and achievements and shortcomings of PKE. Rather than clarifying PKE’s 
position with respect to the mainstream, the important issue is, whether PKE offers useful 
explanations of ongoing socio-economic transformations. Here our assessment will be mixed. 
PKE has generated valuable insights on core areas such as monetary macroeconomics and 
medium-term growth theory, but it offers little on important real world phenomena such as 
supply-side phenomena like the increasing use ICT and the globalisation of production, social 
issues like precarisation and the polarization of income distribution or ecological challenges 
like climate change. It is these issues that will decide the future of PKE. We conclude that 
PKE offers an excellent starting point for macroeconomic analysis, but should develop its 
analysis further. In doing so, it should seek cooperation with other heterodox approaches in 
developing politically relevant problem-oriented alternatives to mainstream analyses. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 opens with a brief overview of important social 
and economic changes in the post-Fordist mode of development. We identify a neoliberal area 
and an area of enlightened neoliberalism. Section 3 discusses the development of the 
mainstream during this time. Section 4 turns to the development of PKE and aims to identify 
achievements and weaknesses. Section 5 outlines a possible strategy for the future 
development of PKE. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Changes in the accumulation regime: from Fordism to 
neoliberalism and enlightened neoliberalism  
 
Given the interdependencies between the political economic development and the fate of 
economic theories we start with a brief overview over the most significant economic 
developments of the post-war period. The 1950s to the mid 1970s marked what has been 
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called ‘golden age’ of capitalism or Fordism.1 Based on a class compromise (or truce) 
between labor and capital, it was characterized by high growth and an active state. The 
international financial system was dominated by the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates. Most states where characterised by an expanding public sector that procured the basic 
infrastructure of the economy and governments (in most developed countries) were 
committed to expansionary interventions in case of recessions. The welfare state emerged in 
many countries and provided a social safety net. This stable international and domestic 
background brought an unprecedented economic boom leading to high employment growth. 
 
The period of rapid growth came to an end in the mid 1970s. The prolonged period of full 
employment put the working class in a powerful position and led to a systematic upward-
pressure on wages. Industrial conflict soared. In combination with increased international 
competition this led to what later came to be called ‘profit squeeze’ (Glyn et al. 1990). 
Productivity growth slowed in part because of a slowdown in capital investment. The 
economic slowdown was further aggravated by the general hike in commodity prices and the 
oil price shocks. This external inflationary pressure triggered a wage-price spiral. 
Simultaneously the Bretton Woods system broke down under the pressure of persistent 
payment imbalances. This led to a stagflationary period and unemployment rates soared (by 
the times’ standards) which was widely conceived as a crisis of the contemporary Keynesian 
policy framework. Political economists (Smithin 1996, Glyn 2006) have argued that with a 
militant labor movement and a surge in inflation (that had turned interest rates negative in the 
1970s) industrial capital ended its truce with labor and realigned with financial capital. This 
new alliance abandoned Keynesian policies. The mid 1970s marked the turn to neoliberal 
                                                 
1 References include Aglietta 1976, Lipietz 1982, Boyer 1990 for the French Regulation School Bowles et al 
1986 for the Social Structures of Accumulation Approach. For more recent discussion see the contributions in 
Marglin and Schor 1990 and Glyn 2006.  
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policies and the beginning of what we call the neoliberal age.2 An imperturbable belief in the 
efficiency of free markets became the key element of the new catechism. At the core of the 
neoliberal agenda has been a redefinition of the role of the government. The political shift 
occurred in several areas.  
 
First, monetary policy hereby as spearhead of the change of tides: by sharply increasing 
interest rates in the early 1980s Central Banks accepted mass unemployment and the debt 
crisis in Latin America as the costs for reducing inflation. The abstinence from fiscal activities 
and independence of central banks in order to facilitate conservative monetary interventions 
was promoted and accomplished in many countries. Waves of privatisation and cutbacks of 
the public sector followed suit.  
 
Second, strong labor unions where identified as an important cause of the stagflationary crisis 
and came under massive political pressure. Directly attacked by governments in the Anglo-
Saxon countries, drained by persistent unemployment in Europe they lost organizational 
strength and political influence. The insistence on free markets justified cutbacks in the 
welfare state and the international opening of most economies - labelled globalisation - further 
increased the pressure on national working classes. The inability of unions to counteract these 
developments resulted in substantial redistribution of income form labor to capital, a 
polarization of income distribution (even within the working class) and in a precarization of 
employment.  
 
Third, domestic and international financial markets were gradually deregulated and 
liberalized. The belief in free markets led to a large-scale promotion of the ideas of free trade 
and international capital mobility. This led to fundamental changes in the financial landscape. 
                                                 
2 In regulationist terminology we would speak of neoliberal mode of regulation and a finance-dominated 
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At the international level capital flows were liberalized. Domestically changes in the financial 
framework gave rise to a rapid pace of financial innovation, eventually increasing the scope 
for speculation. Both developments strengthened the influence of the financial sector. Real 
interest rates rose well above the growth rates of real GDP. Financial ratios such as stock 
market capitalization, derivatives turnover or cross-border lending soared (Glyn 2006, p.51). 
Overall the income shares of financial capital increased substantially (Duménil and Lévy 
2001, Power et al 2003). Moreover, the influence of financial investors on non-financial 
business has increased substantially under the so called shareholder value revolution 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). These structural changes have been summarily called 
financialization; the structure of accumulation is now dominated by the financial sector 
(Stockhammer 2008b). A crucial side effect of this development has been that financial crises 
– always intrinsic to capitalist economies (Kindleberger 2005) – accelerated in both, 
frequency and impact. From the debt crisis of the early 1980s, the EMS crisis of the early 
1990s to the South-East Asian and Latin American crises of the late 1990s to the bursting of 
the dot.com bubble of early 2000s in the USA to the present crisis emanating from the 
subprime mortgage sector – financial crises have been a reoccurring feature of finance-led 
capitalism.  
 
In the early 1990s neoliberalism gave way to what we call enlightened neoliberalism. This 
was a shift from free market ideology to a free market cum limited (and biased) state 
intervention. This more pragmatic approach incorporated interventions to address some 
market failures. While neoliberalism (as in Friedman and Hayek) was an outright attack on 
the state and the claim that free markets would take care of themselves, enlightened 
neoliberalism accepts a role for the government as long as it is temporary and consistent with 
market incentives. Implicitly it was recognized that markets need institutions and 
                                                                                                                                                        
accumulation regime (Stockhammer 2008a). 
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governments. To illustrate the difference: In case of financial crisis active (monetary) policy 
was required, but in the long run only free markets would be desirable. In terms of labor 
market policies the emphasis shifted from an outright dismantling of the welfare state to 
restructuring the welfare state such as to guarantee that market incentives are operational. In 
Europe this approach has come under the heading of flexicurity. State intervention in 
enlightened liberalism has always been biased. First, there is class bias. While in case of a 
financial crisis state support has been coming quick and substantial, in case of unemployment 
state activism was restrained at best. Second, there is a double standard for core and 
peripheral countries. While expansionary government policy was considered necessary in case 
of a financial crisis in the North, the free market catechism was forced upon the countries of 
the developing world.  
 
Whilst the labor movement has been substantially weakened and has so far proven unable to 
effectively counter neoliberalism, two waves of new social movements have ideologically 
challenged neoliberalism: in the 1980s, the environmental movement, the peace movement 
and the feminist movement and, in the 1990s, the alter-mondialist movement.3 These largely 
operate aside traditional institutional forms of political participation. Compared to traditional 
labour movements this made it easier to develop a distinctly international dimension - an asset 
that hardly can be overstated in an age of international capital - but made it more difficult to 
exert direct influence. The fact that there has been no fusion of the labor movement and the 
new social movements is one of the causes for the weakness of the left.  
 
The neoliberal regime with deregulated finance has led to lingering social tension due to 
increasing social polarization and to a succession of financial crises. As the world goes trough 
financial and economic turmoil even the enlightened version of neoliberalism is under 
  7 
pressure and increasingly questioned (Stiglitz 2008), even by former proponents (Wolf 2008). 
This in all likelihood will have some feedback on the dominant academic theories. To what 
extent this will benefit PKE is open. We do not intend to imply that the present crisis (or any 
of the ones that will certainly follow in deregulated financial regime) will bring about a (Post) 
Keynesian renaissance in academia, but it does create ideological discord and confusion 
within the mainstream and thus create opportunities of heterodox economists.  
 
3. The mainstream: plus ca change …  
 
It has never been straightforward to define the mainstream. In order for the mainstream to be 
convincing it has to be broad enough to allow for debates. It cannot be completely 
homogenous but has to allow for conflicting views. Rather than identifying the mainstream 
with a particular theory, we define it as a common ground for debate (that excludes some 
arguments or theories).4 Let us circumscribe the mainstream institutionally with respect to 
two dimensions: what is published in the leading journals (or by economists at leading 
research institutions) and what leading economic policy institutions and governments use as 
theoretical foundation for their policies. The latter dimension is important because it 
highlights that mainstream economics is not a purely academic affair. It also will become 
obvious that there is substantial disagreement within the mainstream and there will be inner 
rings (where these dimensions overlap) and outer rings of the mainstream. Clearly, there can 
be dissent within the mainstream. We will highlight some changes over time and address the 
issue of what the mainstream is with respect to micro, macro and policy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 We use this term rather than ‘anti-globalization movement’ that is used in popular media because most of these 
movement criticizes neoliberal globalization and advocate a different, solidaristic kind of globalization.  
4 This is not intended to empty the term mainstream of its ideological content, but merely to dissociate from 
particular theories. While Monetarism would qualify as mainstream in the early 1980s, by the mid 1990s both 
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Let us thus begin by reviewing the post-war mainstream, that is, the Neoclassical-Keynesian 
synthesis (called “Bastard Keynesianism” by Joan Robinson). Its grand achievement was to 
maintain and reformulate the neoclassical research program while giving room for some 
Keynesian arguments. The Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis had three important features. 
First, there was an uneasy split - one is tempted to say schizophrenia - between 
microeconomics and macroeconomics. While microeconomics was the world of rational 
behaviour, utility functions, optimizing behaviour and clearing markets (short, based on first 
principles), macroeconomics for large parts more pragmatically aimed at ‘realism’ often 
taking social groups (rather than individuals) as starting point. Behavioral functions were 
intended to be realistic (plausible in an inductive sense) and non-clearing markets (in 
particular labour markets) were taken for granted. To be sure, there was no lack of tension 
between microeconomics and macroeconomics, which in turn fuelled research. A second 
feature is closely related to this schizophrenia: a sharp distinction between the short run and 
the long run (in particular in macroeconomics). This allowed leading economists (such as 
Samuelson or Solow) to be Keynesian (in the short run) as well as neoclassical (in the long 
run). Thirdly, in economic policy the mainstream was post-liberal (the term embedded 
liberalism has been coined for the postwar system): important parts of the economy were 
heavily shaped by state intervention, in particular the welfare state cushioned the market 
mechanism and financial markets were strongly regulated. Countercyclical policy was part of 
the policy agenda.  
 
In the course of the 1970s and 80s substantial changes occurred in all three fields: policy, 
macro and micro. The shift in economic policy has already been discussed in the section 2. 
The break in macroeconomics was a conspicuous one, which ended with a redefinition of how 
macroeconomics had to be done - there had to be microfoundations. The neoclassical attack 
                                                                                                                                                        
New Keynesianism and Real Business Cycle Theory can be regarded as mainstream. The mainstream does have 
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took several forms (a rediscovery of Hayek, Monetarism, New Classical Economics, Real 
Business Cycle theory) and succeeded in establishing that in macroeconomics behavioural 
functions had to be derived from ‘first principles’, i.e. behavioural functions had to be derived 
from individual optimizing behaviour. 
 
Eventually there was a reformulation of Bastard Keynesianism: New Keynesianism. It 
accepted the dogma of microfoundations and, by introducing transaction costs, seeked to 
generate pseudo-Keynesian results. It is a resurrection of the Synthesis but more thoroughly 
grounded in neoclassical principles than the old version. It deviates from the neoclassical 
research program: non-clearing markets are frequent (in the short run). New Keynesianism 
has become a powerful applied research program that informs policy making: from the 
NAIRU theory to business cycle theory. New Keynesian, in particular in the form of the so-
called New Consensus Model (NCM), can now be considered mainstream with respect to 
macroeconomic policy making and is providing the theoretical basis for enlightened 
neoliberalism.5 However in academia and in the leading journals, New Classicals are well and 
alive.6  
 
The break in microeconomics was more of a shift (or a growth of niches) than a break. At the 
same time that New Classicals were resurrecting neoclassical macroeconomics it became 
increasingly acceptable to transcend the neoclassical research program in microeconomics 
itself. Colander et al. (2004) define the neoclassical research program as the holy trinity of 
                                                                                                                                                        
an ideological core: the belief that flexible markets will in the long run generate optimal outcomes. 
5 Two examples will illustrate this point. First, after the South-East Asian financial crisis there was a short debate 
on the appropriate economic policies, in particular with respect to the IMF. The main proponents, Stanley 
Fischer (the IMF’s chief economist) on the one hand and Joseph Stiglitz (the resigned chief economist of the 
World Bank) on the other hand are both leading New Keynesians. Second, the debate on European 
unemployment is analytically framed within the NAIRU model, again a New Keynesian model. According to the 
preference of the author it can be used to argue that monetary policy has been too tight (Ball 1999) or that rigid 
labor market institutions are to blame (IMF, 2003, Nickell et al 2005). 
6 Basically no central bank is using a RBC model of the economy. It this sense they are all New Keynesians now. 
However in the form of DGSE models the RBC models sneak in again in policy making. 
  10 
rationality, greed and equilibrium. Each of these has been questioned. First, a powerful 
literature emerged demonstrating that under asymmetric information (and rational behaviour) 
markets will typically not clear (Akerlof 1970, Stiglitz 1987). The implications of this 
approach are profound theoretically but ambiguous politically. Unlike the transaction costs of 
New Keynesian macro, information asymmetries do not disappear in the long run. 
Competitive equilibrium will not be pareto efficient and the First Welfare Theorem does not 
hold (Stiglitz 1994). Unlike the old Keynesian argument about the lack of effective demand, 
however, there usually is no quick fix (in terms of government policy) for the inefficiencies.  
 
Second, there was an increasing empirical literature demonstrating that people do not behave 
rationally and that they often do not behave selfishly. Slowly experimental economics was 
born. People were shown to be sensitive to irrelevant details (framing), they include irrelevant 
information (anchoring) etc. and they happily cooperate in prisoners dilemma experiments.7  
 
Representatives of both streams have received the highest honours of the profession: the 
Nobel Prize and a publication in the AER. They are thus part of the academic mainstream 
while they have strong Post-Walrasian elements. Unfortunately the vice versa does not hold 
here. While (some) post-Walrasian economists (or arguments) clearly have become 
mainstream, it is much less clear whether the mainstream of microeconomics has become Post 
Walrasian.   
 
Microeconomics has become a much more diverse field. Arguments can be made now, that 
only two decades ago would have been frowned upon and dismissed as irrelevant or, worse, 
sociological.8 Institutionally, however, the mainstream has become more rather than less 
                                                 
7 Useful overviews include Bowles and Gintis (2000) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2002). 
8 Colander et al. claim that the “holy trinity of rationality, greed, and equilibrium is in the process of being 
replaced with a new orthodoxy, which can be described as an approach based on a holy trinity of purposeful 
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exclusive. The high degree of formalization of economics is probably one of the most 
important barriers for heterodox economists (Lawson 2006). But many heterodox papers are 
formal. A frequent experience of heterodox economists is that their papers are rejected by 
mainstream journals without even being sent out to referees. The establishment of journal 
ratings and their use in tenure and hiring decisions is stifling innovation (Frey 2003) and has 
made it a lot harder for heterodox economists to get their work recognized. And there is a 
complex intermingling of politics and exclusionary mainstream: There are some theorems that 
are considered deep truths– such as that free trade is a good thing,9 that minimum wages are 
bad for employment – that can only be questioned at the cost of potential loss of reputation 
despite the fact that there is a substantial literature questioning the theorems.10  
 
Economic policy is not only influenced by economic theories, but also by political interests. 
One should thus not be surprised that economic policy at times conflicts with ideology. 
Nonetheless one can discern some pattern. In the 1980s neoliberals were ruling the show. 
Since the mid 1990s one does notice some less dogmatic position in the international 
organizations and the USA (but less so in Europe). Most stark is the double standard about the 
trust in financial liberalization. While deregulation and liberalization and an anti-inflationary 
response in case of financial crisis were forcefully preached to (and often forced upon by the 
IMF) the developing world, the policy reaction to the financial crises in the USA seemed to be 
little inhibited by trust in the self-healing abilities of the market system that neoliberalism had 
been preaching for decades. Whether this feeds back into theorizing or not remains to be seen. 
                                                                                                                                                        
behaviour, enlightened self-interest, and sustainability” (Colander et al 2004, VIII), but offer little evidence for 
this. Their discussion is based on “a list of interviewees who were working within this broader mainstream“ 
(Colander et al, 2004, VIII). While these are certainly “cutting edge economists” as the subtitle of the book 
reads, it is not obvious in what sense these scholars represent the mainstream. No serious attempt is made to 
evaluate the reactions of more orthodox parts of the mainstream and their ability to defend orthodoxy. Moreover, 
the book is practically silent on macroeconomic issues. 
9 For example compare Krugman’s textbook on international trade and his academic writings. Samuelson’s reply 
to the reaction on his 2003 JEP paper. Or Blanchard’s academic writings and his New School presentation. 
10 David Card reports staying away from the minimum wage topic after experiencing intense peer pressure. 
(Hayes 2007). 
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In terms of analysis there have been some signs that important institutions were getting more 
open-minded albeit within narrowly prescribed borders (OECD Employment Outlook 2006, 
World Development Report 2006). 
 
Overall the mainstream appears as a contradictory, if nonetheless repressive creature. While 
theoretically the mainstream has become more open, institutionally it has become more 
closed: heterodox economics is largely excluded from mainstream journals and institutions. In 
the field of macroeconomics New Keynesians appeared as a remake of the Neoclassical-
Keynesian synthesis cum microfoundations. In the short run demand matters, in the long run 
not. The major difference to the old Synthesis is that today microfoundations (based on 
optimizing behavior) are accepted as an essential ingredient whereas for the old synthesis 
macro was a separate field. Ironically, there is a substantial difference between 
microeconomics as a field of research and micro-foundations of macroeconomics. In 
microeconomics, experimental economics and behavioural economics questions about the 
very foundations of homo economics are discussed (within the mainstream), while on the 
other hand modern macroeconomics takes optimizing behaviour (and the need for 
neoclassical microfoundations) for granted.  
 
4. The status quo of Post Keynesian economics 
 
Institutionally the history of PKE outside of the mainstream is relatively young. The first 
generation of PKs (Kahn, Kaldor, Robinson, Sraffa) – that started to evolve in the heydays of 
Keynesian policies and the Neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis – was based in top universities 
and published in leading journals. Their research program initially focused on developing 
Keynes’ theory of effective demand into a theory of the long run. This led a focus on theories 
of growth and distribution (Kaldor 1956, Robinson 1956) that was supplemented by monetary 
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and financial aspects by an American line of economists (Weintraub 1959, Minsky 1957). 
These economists were deviants in a theoretical sense but as the capital controversies show 
they were still taken seriously by the mainstream (Levhari/Samuelson 1966, Solow 1975, 
Harcourt 1969).  
 
The issues of distribution and growth have remained prominent in the PK discussion ever 
since, particularly in the form of Kaleckian models. The foundation of these models is a class-
based analysis of the growth process. They usually entail capacity under-utilization and mark-
up pricing (Dutt 1987). The modern appearance of these models has an exogenously 
determined profit margin (via mark-up pricing) which implies exogenously determined real 
wages. Further these models commonly exhibit the paradox of thrift and the paradox of cost. 
The paradox of thrift results out of the assumption that capitalists save more than workers. 
Since the economy grows until investment equilibrates savings an exogenous redistribution of 
income towards workers increases growth. Via accelerated growth thus a reduction in the 
aggregate propensity to save leads to an increase in aggregate savings. The paradox of costs 
on the other hand refers to the fact that an increase in costs (i.e. wages) leads to an increase in 
economic activity and thus to an increase in profit. In extended versions different 
accumulation regimes are possible (Blecker 1989, Marglin and Badhuri 1990); that is the 
growth of the economy might be profit-led or wage-led. The Kaleckian model further is the 
basis of the rich PK analysis of inflation. In this literature inflation is regarded as a cost-push 
phenomenon or a result of an unresolved distributional conflict (Hein and Stockhammer 
2007).  
 
The PK focus on monetary issues was in part a reaction to the rise of monetarism. Long 
before it was (implicitly) acknowledged by the mainstream, PKs insisted on the endogenous 
nature of the money supply (Kaldor 1982). This insight led to a focus on the functioning of 
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the banking sector which in the late 1980s triggered a massive debate about the particular 
shape of the money supply function. The PK views on endogenous money largely fell into 
two camps. The horizontalist analysis started with the observation that loans create deposits 
which at the time was an exact inversion of standard wisdom. Since thus, the banking sector 
was not constrained quantitatively they concluded that the money supply is solely determined 
by the creditworthy demand for credit; that is the money supply is demand determined 
(Moore 1989). Structuralists on the other hand maintained that the asset and liability 
management of banks matters. From this point of view the money supply is in principle 
endogenous to the banking system. However, the larger the sum of outstanding credit 
becomes the more difficulties arise for banks to maintain the reserve requirements and the 
higher the average risk of credits becomes. Consequently, there exists some systematic 
relationship between the amount of outstanding credit and the interest rate (Pollin 1991, 
Palley 1996). This discussion yielded a deep understanding of the functioning of the banking 
industry. Despite the fact that it is still ongoing there seems to be some convergence of the 
respective positions (Fontana 2004).  
 
Based on this broad theoretical background PK authors recently started to develop a well-
grounded critique of the NCM (Arestis and Sawyer 2004). An obvious critique originating out 
of the PK understanding of banking is the lack of an analysis of the banking sector. There is 
some progress compared to earlier neoclassical models in that the money supply is 
endogenous to the model but it is simply determined as a residual without considering the role 
of the banking sector. This is particularly surprising given the fact that NCM implicates a 
massive focus on monetary policy by its insistence on inflation targeting. From a PK point of 
view this insistence on inflation targeting however focuses too strongly on a demand-pull type 
of inflation (special issue of the JPKE 2006). Finally, the vertical long-run Phillips Curve is 
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particularly problematic from a PK perspective (Arestis and Sawyer 2004). Under such a 
framework long-run effects of effective demand simply do not exist.  
 
Related to this literature is a recent stream of the literature which is concerned with policy 
issues and empirical research. In Europe one major objective of this literature has been to 
critically evaluate the economic design of the European Union and to formulate sensible 
alternatives. Obvious and important fields of intervention for these contributions are the lack 
of fiscal coordination in Europe and the contemporaneous monetary policy design. This 
implies a sound critique of the Stability and Growth Pact and propositions of alternative 
policies as concerns tax and wage policy coordination (Arestis et al. 2001). The discussion 
hereby is particularly led in the light of the lacking convergence within the European Union 
(Hein and Truger 2005) and is concerned with the adjustment of labour market institutions 
and wage policies (Stockhammer 2008b). A further field is the critical evaluation of the 
monetary policy of the ECB. The understanding of the stratification of capitalist societies 
hereby allows PKs to recognize that the one-sided focus on price stability mainly serves the 
interests of specific interest groups.  
 
PKs thus are active and continuously make important contributions to the understanding of 
the macro economy. Their contributions are even more remarkable when the hostile 
environment under which they had to be developed is taken into account. PKs were able to 
establish critical masses at some research institutions and established specialized journals. 
However, their existence is heavily contested and they are widely ignored by the mainstream. 
This is a major difference to the times of the capital controversies when it was still possible 
for PK authors to trigger a debate with the mainstream. Today only few PKs are able to 
publish in mainstream journals (e.g. Arestis et al. 2001), others survive by establishing niches. 
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This of courses reduces their impact as regards quantity of citations and similar criteria which 
makes it harder for them when it comes to evaluations and rankings.  
 
After the Cambridge Controversies PKs were effectively excluded from the mainstream and 
have been unable to exploit the contradictions and upheavals within mainstream economics. 
In particular the innovative fringe of mainstream microeconomics seems to be unaware of 
PKE (and at times even of macroeconomics as a distinct field). Worse, this neglect of PK 
ideas occurs at the same time as some long standing arguments of PK theory are usurped by 
the mainstream. The idea of endogenous money has been tacitly incorporated into models of 
NCM where the money stock is determined as a residual in these models. Further it can be 
argued that the idea of conflict inflation is incorporated in the New Keynesian NAIRU 
narrative of the short run (Stockhammer 2008c). Also the notion of hysteresis incorporates PK 
ideas of the path-dependency of the economic growth process. All of this happens without 
acknowledging of the widely available pioneering PK literature on those subjects. On the 
other hand (and partly out of a reaction to their contested situation) PKs indeed tend to be 
highly critical of the mainstream. The potential scope of fruitful interaction between PK and 
the innovative edge of mainstream micro economics remains largely unexplored and there are 
few attempts to communicate from the PK side (such as the special issue of Journal of 
Economic Psychology 2004).  
 
If the yardstick for the evaluation of the relevance of an economic theory is its relevance for 
socially important issues, PKs have to take some blame for certain shortcomings. PKE has 
been focused on a rather reduced set of key concepts initiated by Keynes. Having their own 
virtue this however left certain white points on the PK map of the real world:  
1) There is a strange disparity between the relevance of financial crises in Keynes (and the 
important contributions of Minsky and his followers) and general PK macro-models. Rochon 
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(1999) and Hein (2007) are two excellent treatments of Post Keynes monetary theory that do 
not discuss financial instability as a possible effect of endogenous money. Financial 
instability still appears as an anomaly in the standard PK macro-models.11  
2) The supply side is largely neglected by PKs. Apart from certain important exceptions 
(Arestis and Sawyer 2005, Dutt 2006, Bhaduri 2005) analyses related to the supply side 
hardly appear in the PK literature. This particularly makes it hard to consider aspects such as 
ICT or the “knowledge society”. Moreover, the effects of the transnationalization of large 
corporations and the restructuring of value chains have not received much attention of PKs. 
3) Despite the prominence of the effects of distribution in PK growth models there is hardly 
any analysis of the determinants of distribution. Such crucial factors as union density, the real 
interest rate or the mark-up enter PK models as exogenous variables. There is no systematic 
explanation how the mark-up is determined, how the behaviour of central banks is influenced 
or what determines the participation in worker’s institutions.  
4) Closely related to 3 there exists no PK theory of the state and no systematic analysis of the 
Political Economy. The benevolent public administrator is still implied in many PK models. 
Keynes’ path-breaking analysis of effective demand established the basis for full-employment 
oriented economic policy. Seventy years later economists still essentially propose the same 
kind of pre-Keynesian macroeconomic policies. PKs lack an explanation of the stronghold 
that orthodox economics has on the profession and on the state. Kalecki (1943) had 
highlighted the political contradiction of full employment policies, but this issue has not been 
addressed systematically by PKs. There is no systematic analysis of the motives and impact of 
political interest groups.  
                                                 
11 This is not to say that no analysis in this important field occurs (see e.g. Skott 1994, 1995 and the work at the 
Levy Institute). Our point though is that this analysis occurs alongside the major analytical tasks and is only 
rarely integrated. 
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5) Finally, PKE seems to offer little to evaluate such developments as precarisation or 
flexicurity from a social perspective. PKE has little to say on issues by which important 
groups of modern societies are concerned.  
 
5. How to move forward 
 
PKE shares its defensive position with most heterodox approaches. Lawson (2006) has argued 
that methodology is the unifying thread for heterodox economists. This view implies that 
heterodox economists by definition cannot enter a discussion with the mainstream as they 
speak a different language – they analyse the economy as an open system rather than as a 
closed system. More specifically, Lavoie (2006) points out that there are similarities between 
various heterodox positions on crucial issues like rationality and an organicistic approach to 
society. 
 
This is the background for the ongoing debate on the future of PKE. Two important 
contributions have recently argued that the key to the future is entering a dialogue with 
mainstream economics. “The way forward is for PKE to engage in a more constructive 
dialogue with mainstream economics with the objective of encompassing relevant 
neoclassical models within a more general framework that incorporates PK alternatives.” 
(Fontana and Gerard 2006, 72). A similar point has been made by Colander et al. in a series of 
publications (2004, 2006, 2007). They argue that heterodox economists should not dwell on 
the unfairness of being excluded by the mainstream but try to express their arguments in way 
comprehensible to mainstream economists. All that would be required is a formalization of 
the arguments, the most cutting edge of the mainstream would be eager to listen (Colander et 
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al. 2004).12 Colander et al. exclusively refer to microeconomists. However, modern 
macroeconomics has been largely left untouched in the upheavals of modern microeconomics. 
There are few (and isolated) attempts to integrate non-standard microfoundations into 
macroeconomic models (Akerlof 2006 being a rare exception). The overriding concern of 
PKE however is with macroeconomics. The restricted development of modern 
macroeconomics and the fact that PKs have been largely ignored even in the few fields where 
the both sides have converged (King 2008 p.21) though make the existence of “within 
mainstream” improbable. This is aggravated by the fact that PK (Heterodox) authors are often 
discriminated by the mainstream which in most economics departments enjoys a power 
position (Dequech 2007-8).  
 
Our contribution to this debate is not a novel position on whether it is desirable to enter a 
dialogue with the mainstream or not..13 Rather our point is that the issue of entering into a 
dialogue is a secondary one for the future of PKE. Whether PKs put more effort into entering 
a dialogue with the mainstream will make little difference, simply because there is little 
indication that the core of the mainstream is interested in this dialogue. In fact it typically 
does not even recognize the existence of the PKE (or most other heterodox streams). 
 
In contemplating strategies for the future, we argue that the focus on the relation to the 
mainstream is misplaced. Rather PKE should look at the real world (to identify pressing 
problems), look at themselves (to identify shortcomings in their analysis) and at other 
heterodox streams (to find specific areas of complementarities).  
                                                 
12 Much to their credit, it has to be said that Colander and co-authors put their energy where their mouth is. In 
particular, Barkely Rosser (one of the co-authors of Colander et al. 2004) plays an important role as a 
communicator between this edge of more innovative mainstream and heterodox authors in his role as editor of 
the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 
13 The main benefit of a dialogue would be that PKE might be noticed by the innovative fringes of the 
mainstream. The value of Colander et al.’s contribution is – in our view – not their conclusion, but that they 
highlight many of the interesting and challenging developments at these fringes. 
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 Our first recommendation is rather basic: be politically relevant.14 It is hard to overstate the 
importance of this. In particular it is crucial to develop an analysis for new social and 
economic problems. This is crucial to attract new students as well as the attention of media 
and the economic policy institutions. While we have little hope of displacing the mainstream 
in the short run, we doubt that this hegemony will go unchallenged in the future. But change 
is unlikely to come from within the profession. Economics will be changed by forces from the 
outside. It’s the economy rather than economics that will call for change. The finance-
dominated accumulation regime is prone to crises due to unregulated financial markets and 
the neoliberal mode of regulation is leading to a polarization of income distribution and a 
precarization of employment relations.  
 
This does not mean that a systemic crisis or a revolutionary upheaval is around the corner. But 
it does mean that orthodox economics and the neoliberal mode of development will loose 
legitimacy. As already apparent in the handling of the present financial crisis, neoliberal 
principles are pragmatically jettisoned to save financial institutions. Thus, why should we not 
also ignore them in order to help the unemployed? Different fields of economics will be 
differently affected by such debates, but macroeconomics will certainly be at the centre of 
many debates. This will be an opportunity for PKE to proof its usefulness. But it also poses 
challenges for PKE. The present crisis will not be a re-run of the 1930s. Governments as well 
as New Keynesian economists are much more pragmatic than their counterparts 80 years ago. 
At the same time the social movements pressing for change are much more heterogeneous as 
are the social tensions out of which they have grown. Nor is there a strong political movement 
                                                 
14 This is not intended as the reinvention of the wheel. Indeed, many PKs are well aware of this basic imperative. 
In particular the Levy Institute, the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) The annual conference of 
(German) Research Network Macroeconomic Theory and Macroeconomic Policies already have a policy-
oriented focus as do many special issues of the JPKE. Paul Davidson and Henry Liu have initiated an open letter 
regarding the reform of the financial markets (Davidson/Liu 2008) and the list could well be extended.  
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(as the socialist movement of the 1920s) pushing for fundamental societal change. In other 
words, it is not clear to what extent PKE will be able to benefit from the repercussions that the 
present financial crisis will have on economics. Developing an analysis (and policy 
suggestions) for present problems will force PKs not only to develop further their theory of 
financial crisis but also to address issues that they have had little to say about as of yet: 
globalization, the working poor, atypical employment relations.  
 
While the medium run may offer more room for debates, in the present and the near future, 
the situation of PK has accurately been described as that of an embattled minority (King 
2002). Among the most pressing problems are the marginalization in academia via research 
assessments and journal ratings. The formation of heterodox economics as well as (possibly) 
the consolidation of dissenting views at the fringes of the mainstream offers chances of 
institutional cooperation in the fight for a pluralistic economics.  
 
Our second recommendation is thus that PKs seek to cooperate institutionally with other 
heterodox approaches and non-orthodox streams in the fight for a pluralistic economics. PKs 
alone simply don’t have the critical mass to press for more inclusive journal ratings and 
evaluation mechanisms. For that large associations are needed as lobbying institutions and the 
formation of a heterodox camp may offer a chance for this (EAEPE, AHE).  
 
The third recommendation is that the research agenda PK requires expansion in several 
directsion. As elaborated in section 3, PKE has in several important aspects kept too closely 
to its original research program and shows crucial gaps in its analysis. PKE, in other words, 
should become more Post and less Keynesian. Changes in the economy and developments in 
mainstream economics as well as in other heterodox approach have made many of these gaps 
apparent. Some examples will illustrate our case. First, consider the role of institutions. While 
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it may not be very surprising that institutionalists have more to say about institutions in 
general than PK, it is ironic that mainstream economics now often makes a much more 
elaborated empirical attempt to include the effects of institutions on economic growth than 
PKE. This is in spite of the fact that PKs have long argued (certainly much longer than 
mainstream growth theory) that institutions matter for growth. Second, there is a broad range 
of recent social and economic phenomena that PKs have had little to say about: ICT, 
globalization, precarisation and environmental destruction. Many of these changes are either 
“too supply-side” or “too micro” for PKs. While some of these issues may seem remote from 
PK theory, others are close to home, but have been ignored. For example, there is next to no 
discussion of environmental degradation in PK growth theory. Third, PKE has also failed to 
elaborate a theory of the state and the social groups that influence government behaviour. 
Essentially PKE has no answer to the question, why pre-Keynesian economic policies persist. 
In Keynes’ times it was easy to argue, that they didn’t know better. Neoliberalism, however, 
seems to have been a deliberate decision not to use Keynesian policies. Enlightened 
neoliberalism uses government policies selectively and in a class-biased way. 
 
In all these areas there should be obvious potential gains from cooperation between PKs and 
other heterodox positions. Institutional and evolutionary economics have elaborate theories of 
institutions, Ecological Economists have done a lot to highlight the detrimental effects of 
growth, Marxists have developed rich theories of class and the state. We are not advocating a 
grand heterodox synthesis, but problem-specific heterodox synthesis approaches.15 Take real-
world problems and analyse them by making use of different heterodox approaches. PKE is 
plainly not sufficient to do justice to many of today’s social and economic problems. 
 
                                                 
15 A grand unifying heterodox synthesis may be the outcome of such cooperative project, but it is far from clear 
whether different heterodox approaches are consistent. However, this does not preclude a problem-oriented 
cooperation among heterodox approaches. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The debate on the future of PKE has focused on PKE’s relation to the mainstream. This has 
served to highlight the rich and contradictory developments within the mainstream. There is 
an intimate, if complex, link between the mainstream in academia and in economic policy. A 
version of New Keynesian theory has been identified as the core of the mainstream, that is 
consistent with enlightened neoliberalism, i.e. accepting a role for the state in the short run 
while establishing a competitive equilibrium as the key long run reference point. In academia 
the mainstream has become more open internally in the past two decades with the 
development of post-Walrasian ideas in microeconomics (in particular where they have little 
relation to or effect on economic policy). At the same time the fences around mainstream 
economics have become high by means of excessive formalization, discriminatory journal 
rating and (less subtly) by blatant exclusion.  
 
We have argued that this focus on the relation to mainstream economics is misplaced. While 
the dialogue with the mainstream may be desirable, the key questions for PKs lie elsewhere. 
First, PKE has to be relevant in explaining real-world problems. The neoliberal mode of 
development delivers enough of them as the present financial crisis demonstrates. This may 
come with its own dilemmas, e.g. academic credibility vs. political applicability, but it will 
raise more interesting questions than trying to reformulate PK models such that they are easy 
to understand for mainstream economists (if they care to listen). Second, institutionally, PK 
should strengthen their ties with other heterodox economists to defend space for pluralism in 
the profession. Thirdly, PKE should fill its gaps in its theory. Many of the present-day social 
and economic problems are not sufficiently addressed in PK analysis. Doing so will take PKs 
beyond PKE, they should do so by cooperating with other heterodox streams. 
 
  24 
References 
 
Akerlof, George, 1970. The market for lemons. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 3: 488-
500 
Akerlof, G. (2006): The missing motivation in macroeconomics. Preliminary Draft: Presidential Adress 
American Economic Association, Chicago, January 6, 2007.  
Arestis, P., McCauley, C. and M. Sawyer (2001): 'An alternative stability pact for the European Union' 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 25, 113-130 
Arestis, P., Demetriades, P., Luintel, K., (2001): Financial Development and Economic Growth: the role 
of stock markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February. 
Arestis, P., Sawyer, M. (2004): Re-examining monetary and fiscal policy for the twenty-first century. 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Arestis, P., Sawyer, Malcom (2005): Aggregate Demand, Conflict and Capacity in the Inflationary 
Process. Cambridge Journal of Ecnomics, 29, 6, 956-74. 
Bhaduri, A., Marglin, S., (1990): Unemployment and the real wage: the economic basis for contesting 
political ideologies. Cambridge Journal of Economics 14, 4: 375-93 
Bhaduri, A., (2005): Endogenous economic growth: A new approach. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 30, 1, pp. 69-83 
Bhaduri, A., (2006): Endogenous Growth: A New Approach. Cambridge Journal of Ecnomics, 30, 1, 69-
83. 
Blecker, R., (1989): International competition, income distribution and economic growth. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 13: 395-412 
Bowles S, Gordon D, Weisskopf T E, (1986): Power and Profits: The Social Structure of Accumulation 
and the Profitability of the Postwar US Economy, Review of Radical Political Economics 
1986/1&2, 132-167 
Bowles, S, Gintis, H, (2000): Walrasian Economics in Retrospect. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 
(4), 1411-39 
Colander, D., Holt, R., Rosser, B. (2004): The changing face of mainstream economics.  Review of 
Political Economy, 16, 4, 485-499 
Colander, D., Holt, R., Rosser, B. (2006): The changing face of mainstream economics – Conversations 
with cutting edge economists. University of Michigan Press. Michigan.  
Davidson, P., Liu, H. (2008): Open Letter: The Way Forward, Asia Times, Nov. 8 
Dequech, D., (2007-8): Neoclassical, mainstream, orthodox, and heterodox economics. Journal of PKE, 
30, 2, 279-302 
Dutt, A., (1984): Stagnation, income distribution and monopoly power. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics  8: 25-40 
Dutt, A., (1987): Alternative closures again: a comment on growth, distribution and inflation. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 11, 1: 75-82 
Dutt, A., (2005): On Post Walrasian Economics, Macroeconomic Policy, and Heterodox Economics. 
Înternational Journal of Political Economy, 33, 2, 47-67 
Dutt, A., (2006): Aggregate demand, aggregate supply and economic growth. International Review of 
Applied Economics 20, 3, pp. 319-36 
Epstein, G, Jayadev, A, (2005): The rise of rentier incomes in OECD countries: financialization, Central 
Bank policy and labor solidarity In: G. Epstein (ed): Financialization and the World Economy. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Fehr, E, Fischbacher, U, (2002): Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-selfish Motives on 
Competition, Cooperation and Incentives. Economic Journal 112, C1-C33 
Fontana G., (2004): Rethinking endogenous money: a constructive interpretation of the debate 
between horizontalists and structuralists. Metroeconomica, 55, 4, 367-385 
Fontana G., Gerrard, B., (2006): The Future of PKE. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quaterly Review, 59, 
236, 49-80 
Frey, B., (2003): Publishing as prostitution? – Choosing between one’s own  ideas and academic 
success. Public Choice, 116, 1-2, 205-223. 
Glyn, A, Hughes, A, Lipietz, A, Sing, A, (1990): The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age. In: S Marglin and 
J Schor (eds): The Golden Age of Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
  25 
Glyn, A. (2004): Capitalism unleashed: Finance, Globalization and Welfare. Oxford University Press.  
Harcourt, G., (1969): Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital Journal of Economic 
Literature 7, 2: 369-405 
Hayes, C., (2007): Hip Heterodoxy, The Nation June 11.  
Hein, E., (2008): Money Distribution Conflict and Capital Accumulation. Contributions to ‘Monetary 
Analysis’ (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
Hein, E., Stockhammer, E. (2007): Macroeconomic policy mix, employment and inflation in a PK 
alternative to the new consensus model. Department of Economics Working Paper Series, WP. 
110 University of Economics, Vienna 
Hein, E, Truger, A., (2005): European Monetary Union: nominal convergence, real divergence and 
slow growth? Structural Change and Economic Dynamics,  16, 7-33 
Kaldor, N., (1956): Alternative Theories of Distribution. Review of Economic Studies 23, 2: 83-100 
Kaldor, N., (1957): A model of economic growth. EJ LXVII: 591-624 
Kaldor, N., (1982): The Scourge of Monetarism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kalecki, M., (1943): Political aspects of full employment. Political Quarterly XIV, 4: 322-31. Reprinted 
in: Kalecki, Michal, 1971. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
King, J., (2002): A History of PKE Since 1936. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
King, J., (2008): Heterodox Macroeconomics: What exactly are we against? in Wray, Randall Keynes 
and macroecnomics after 70 years.  
Kindleberger, C., Aliber, R. (2005): Manias, Panics and Crashes, Basinstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Lavoie, M. (2006): Do heterodox theories have anything in common? A Post-Keynesian point of view. 
Intervention, 3, 1, 87-112. 
Lawson, T. (2007): Methodological Issues in the Study of Gender. Journal of International Economics 
Studies, 21, 1-66  
Lawson, T., (2006): The nature of heterodox economics. Cambridge Journal of Economics 30, 483-505 
Lazonick, W, O'Sullivan, M.(2000): Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate 
governance. Economy and Society 29, 1: 13-35 
Levhari, D., Samuelson, P., (1966): The nonswitching theorem is false. The Quaterly Journal of 
Economics, 80, 4, 518-519  
Marglin, S., Badhuri, A. (1990): Profit Squeeze and Keynesian Theory in: Marglin, Stephen, Schor, 
Juliet, The golden Age of Capitalism – Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 
Minsky, H.1957. Monetary Systems and Accelerator Models. American Economics Review, 47, 859-883 
Minsky, H. (1982): The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of the 
Economy. In: C Kindleberger and Laffrague (eds): Financial Crises: Theory, History and 
Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Minsky, H. (1986): Stabilizing an unstable economy. New Haven: Yale University Press 
Moore, Basil, (1989): A simple model of bank intermediation. Journal of PKE, 12, 1, 10-28 
OECD (2006): Employment Outlook 2006. Paris: OECD 
Palley, T. (1996): PKE: debt, distribution and the macro economy. Basinstoke: Macmillan.  
Pollin, R. (1991): Two theories of money supply endogeneity: some empirical evidence. JPKE 13, 3: 
366-98 
Power, D., Epstein, G., Abrena, M., (2003): Trends in the rentier income share in OECD countries 1960-
2000. PERI Working Paper 58a 
Robinson, Joan, (1956): The accumulation of capital. London: Macmillan 
Robinson, Joan, (1956): The accumulation of capital. London: Macmillan 
Rochon, Louis-Philippe, (1999):  Credit, Money and Production. An Alternative Post-Keynesian 
Approach. Edward Elgar  
Smithin, J. (1996): Macroeconomic Policy and the Future of Capitalism: The Revenge of the Rentiers 
and the Threat to Prosperity. Edward Elgar 
Solow, R., (1975): Brief Comments. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, 1, pp. 48-52 
Stiglitz, J. (1987): The causes and consequences of the dependence of quality on price. Journal of 
Economic Literature 25, 1-48 
Stiglitz, J. (1994): Whither Socialism? Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 
Stiglitz, J. (2008): The End of Neo-liberalism, New Europe July 21. 
  26 
Stockhammer, E. (2008a): Some stylized facts on the finance-dominated accumulation regime. 
Competition and Change 12, 2: 189-207 
Stockhammer, E. (2008b): Wage moderation does not work. Review of Radical Political Economy, 39, 
3, 391-97 
Stockhammer, E. (2008c): Is the NAIRU a Monetarist, New Keynesian, PK or Marxist theory? 
Metroeconomica 59 (4), 479-510 
Weintraub, S. (1959): A general theory of the price level, output, income distribution and economic 
growth. Greenwood press, publishers, Westport. 
Wolf, M. (2008): The rescue of Bear Stearns marks liberalisation’s limit, Financial Times March 25 
Worldbank (2002): Building Institutions for Markets. World Development Report 2002. Washington, 
DC : Worldbank 
Worldbank (2006): Equity and Development. World Development Report 2006. Washington, DC : 
Worldbank 
 
  27 
Bisher sind in dieser Reihe erschienen: 
 
 
Eigl R., Experimentielle Methoden in der Mikroökonomik, No. 1, Mai 1991. 
Dockner E., Long N.V., International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Non-Cooperative Strategies, No. 
2, September 1991. 
Andraea C.A., Eigl R., Der öffentliche Sektor aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht, No. 3, Oktober 1991. 
Dockner E., A Dynamic Theory of Conjectural Variations, No. 4, Oktober 1991. 
Feichtinger G., Dockner E., Cyclical Consumption Pattern and Rational Addictions, No. 5, Oktober 1991. 
Marterbauer M., Die Rolle der Fiskalpolitik im Schwedischen Wohlfahrtsstaat, No. 6, Dezember 1991. 
Pichler E., Cost-Sharing of General and Specific Training with Depreciation of Human Capital, No. 7, 
Dezember 1991. 
Pichler E., Union Wage Bargaining and Status, No. 8, Dezember 1991. 
Pichler E., Costs of Negotiations and the Structure of Bargaining - a Note, No. 9, Dezember 1991. 
Nowotny E., The Austrian Social Partnership and Democracy, No. 10, Dezember 1991. 
Pichler E., Walther H., The Economics of Sabbath, No. 11, April 1992. 
Klatzer E., Unger B., Will Internationalization Lead to a Convergence of National Economic Policies?,No. 12, 
June 1992. 
Bellak C., Towards a Flexible Concept of Competitiveness, No. 13, May 1992. 
Koren St., Stiassny A., The Temporal Causality between Government Taxes and Spending, No. 14, August 
1992. 
Altzinger W., Ost-West-Migration ohne Steuerungsmöglichkeiten?, No. 15, September 1992. 
Bellack Ch., Outsiders' Response to Europe 1992, Case of Austria, No. 16, December 1992. 
Guger A., Marterbauer M., Europäische Währungsunion und Konsequenzen für die Kollektiv-vertragspolitik, 
No. 17, January 1993. 
Unger B., van Waarden F., Characteristics, Governance, Performance and Future Perspectives, No. 18, 
January 1993. 
Scharmer F., The Validity Issue in Applied General Equilibrium Tax Models, No. 19, May 1993. 
Ragacs Ch., Minimum Wages in Austria: Estimation of Employment Functions, No. 20, June 1993. 
Ragacs Ch., Employment, Productivity, Output and Minimum Wages in Austria: A Time Series Analysis, No. 
21, September 1993. 
Stiassny A., TVP - Ein Programm zur Schätzung von Modellen mit zeitvariierenden Parametern, No. 22, 
December 1993. 
Gstach D., Scale Efficiency: Where Data Envelopment Analysis Outperforms Stochastic Production Function 
Estimation, No. 23, December 1993. 
Gstach D., Comparing Structural Efficiency of Unbalanced Subsamples: A Resampeling Adaptation of Data 
Envelopment Analysis, No. 24, December 1993. 
Klausinger H., Die Klassische Ökonomie und die Keynesianische Alternative. Revision ein Mythos?, No. 25, 
December 1993. 
Grandner T., Gewerkschaften in einem Cournot-Duopol. Sequentielle versus simultane Lohnverhandlungen, 
No. 26, April 1994. 
Stiasssny A., A Note on Frequency Domain Properties of Estimated VARs, No. 27, June 1994. 
Koren St., Stiassny A., Tax and Spend or Spend and Tax ? An International Study, No. 28, August 1994. 
Gstach D., Data Envelopment Analysis in a Stochastic Setting: The right answer form the wrong model?, No. 
29, August 1994. 
Cantwell J., Bellak Ch., Measuring the Importance of International Production: The Re-Estimation of Foreign 
Direct Investment at Current Values, No. 30, January 1995. 
Klausinger H., Pigou’s Macroeconomics of Unemployment (1933). A Simple Model, No. 31, February 1995.  
Häfke Ch., Helmenstein Ch., Neural Networks in Capital Markets: An Application to Index Forecasting, No. 
32, January 1995. 
Hamberger K., Katzmair H., Arithmetische Politik und ökonomische Moral, Zur Genologie der 
Sozialwissenschaften in England, No. 33, May 1995. 
Altzinger W., Beschäftigungseffekte des österreichischen Osthandels, No. 34, July 1995. 
Bellak Ch., Austrian Manufacturing Firms Abroad - The last 100 Years, No. 35, November 1995. 
Stiassny A., Wage Setting, Unemployment and the Phillips Curve, No. 36, January 1996. 
Zagler M., Long-Run Monetary Non-Neutrality in a Model of Endogenous Growth, No. 37, June 1996. 
Traxler F., Bohmann G., Ragacs C., Schreckeneder B., Labour Market Regulation in Austria, No. 38, 
January, 1996. 
Gstach D., A new approach to stochastic frontier estimation: DEA+, No. 39, August 1996. 
Bellak Ch., Clement W., Hofer R., Wettbewerbs- und Strukturpolitik: Theoretische Begründung und neuere 
Entwicklungen in Österreich, No. 40, June 1996. 
Nowotny E., Dritter Sektor, Öffentliche Hand und Gemeinwirtschaft, No. 41, August 1996. 
Grandner T., Is Wage-Leadership an Instrument to Coordinate Union’s Wage-Policy? The Case of Imperfect 
Product Markets, No. 42, November 1996. 
Pirker R., The Constitution of Working Time, No. 43, Januar 1997. 
Nowotny E., Konsequenzen einer Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft für unsere Gesellschaft, No. 44, Januar 
1997. 
Grandner T., Territoriale Evolution von Kooperation in einem Gefangenendilemma, No. 45, February 1997. 
Häfke Ch., Sögner L., Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information, No. 46, February 1997. 
Stiassny A., Die Relevanz von Effizienzlöhnen im Rahmen von Gewerkschaftsverhandlungsmodellen, No. 
47, May 1997. 
Stiassny A., Unsicherheit bezüglich der Preiselastizität der Güternachfrage als reale Rigidität, No. 48, May 
1997.  
Klausinger H., Die Alternativen zur Deflationspolitik Brünings im Lichte zeitgenössischer Kritik, No. 49, June 
1997. 
Wehinger G.D., Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization: Pleasant Monetary Dynamics?. No. 50, August 1997. 
Wehninger G.D., Are Exchange Rate-Based Stabilizations Expansionary? Theoretical Considerations and 
the Brazilian Case, No. 51, August 1997. 
Huber C., Sögner L., Stern A., Selbstselektierendes Strompreisregulierungsmodell, No. 52, August 1997. 
Ragacs Ch., Zagler M., Economic Policy in a Model of Endogenous Growth, No. 53, October 1997. 
Mahlberg B., Url T., Effects of the Single Market on the Austrian Insurance Industry, No. 54, February 1998.  
Gstach D., Grander T., Restricted Immigration In as Two-Sector Economy, No. 55, March 1998.  
Sögner L., Regulation of a Complementary Imputed Good in a Competitive Environment, No. 56, March 
1998. 
Altzinger W., Austria's Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: 'Supply Based' or Marked 
Driven?, No. 57, April 1998. 
Gstach D., Small Sample Performance of Two Approaches to Technical Efficiency Estimation in Noisy 
Multiple Output Environments, No. 58, June 1998. 
Gstach D., Technical Efficiency in Noisy Multi-Output Settings, No. 59, June 1998. 
Ragacs Ch., Zagler M., Growth Theories and the Persistence of Output Fluctuations: The Case of Austria, 
No. 60, October 1998.   
Grandner T., Market Shares of Price Setting Firms and Trade Unions, No. 61, October 1998. 
Bellak Ch., Explaining Foreign Ownership by Comparative and Competitive Advantage: Empirical Evidence, 
No. 62, March 1999.  
Klausinger H., The Stability of Full Employment. A Reconstruction of Chapter 19-Keynesianism, No. 63, April 
1999. 
Katzmair H., Der Modellbegriff in den Sozialwissenschaften. Zum Programm einer kritischen Sozio-Logik, 
No. 64, June 1999. 
Rumler F., Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, Numerical Simulations in a 2-Country Monetary 
General Equilibrium Model, No. 65, June 1999. 
Zagler M., Endogenous Growth, Efficiency Wages and Persistent Unemployment, No. 66, September 1999. 
Stockhammer E., Robinsonian and Kaleckian Growth. An Update on Post-Keynesian Growth Theories, No. 
67, October 1999. 
Stockhammer E., Explaining European Unemployment: Testing the NAIRU Theory and a Keynesian 
Approach, No. 68, February 2000. 
Klausinger H., Walras’s Law and the IS-LM Model. A Tale of Progress and Regress, No. 69, May 2000. 
Grandner T., A Note on Unionized Firms’ Incentive to Integrate Vertically, No. 70, May 2000. 
Grandner T., Optimal Contracts for Vertically Connected, Unionized Duopolies,  No. 71, July 2000. 
Heise, A., Postkeynesianische Beschäftigungstheorie, Einige prinzipielle Überlegungen, No. 72, August 
2000. 
Heise, A., Theorie optimaler Lohnräume, Zur Lohnpolitik in der Europäischen Währungsunion, No. 73, 
August 2000. 
Unger B., Zagler M., Institutional and Organizational Determinants of Product Innovations. No. 74, August 
2000. 
Bellak, Ch., The Investment Development Path of Austria, No. 75, November 2000. 
Heise, A., Das Konzept einer nachhaltige Finanzpolitik aus heterodoxer Sicht – ein Diskussionsbeitrag, No. 
76, April 2001. 
Kocher M., Luptacik M., Sutter M., Measuring Productivity of Research in Economics. A Cross-Country 
Study Using DEA, No. 77, August 2001. 
Munduch, G., Pfister A., Sögner L., Stiassny A., Estimating Marginal Costs fort he Austrian Railway System, 
No. 78, Februray  2002. 
Stückler M., Überprüfung von Gültigkeit und Annahmen der Friedman-These für Rohstoffmärkte, No. 79, 
July 2002. 
Stückler M., Handel auf Terminkontraktmärkten, No. 80, July 2002. 
Ragacs Ch., Minimum Wages, Human Capital, Employment and Growth, No. 81, August 2002. 
Klausinger H., Walras’ Law in Stochastic Macro Models: The Example of the Optimal Monetary Instrument, 
No. 82, November 2002. 
Gstach D., A Statistical Framework for Estimating Output-Specific Efficiencies, No. 83, February 2003. 
Gstach D., Somers A., Warning S., Output specific efficiencies: The case of UK private secondary schools, 
No. 84, February 2003. 
Kubin I., The dynamics of wages and employment in a model of monopolistic competition and efficient 
bargaining, No. 85. May 2003. 
Bellak Ch., The Impact of Enlargement on the Race For FDI. No. 86 Jan. 2004 
Bellak Ch., How Domestic and Foreign Firms Differ and Why Does it Matter?. No. 87 Jan. 2004 
Grandner T., Gstach D., Joint Adjustment of house prices, stock prices and output towards short run 
equilibrium, No. 88. January 2004 
Currie M., Kubin I., Fixed Price Dynamics versus Flexible Price Dynamics, No. 89, January 2005 
Schönfeld S., Reinstaller A., The effects of gallery and artist reputation on prices in the primary market for 
art: A note, No. 90, May 2005 
Böheim, R. and Muehlberger, U., Dependent Forms of Self-employment in the UK: Identifying Workers on 
the Border between Employment and Self-employment. No. 91, Feb. 2006 
Hammerschmidt, A., A strategic investment game with endogenous absorptive capacity. No. 92, April 2006 
Onaran, Ö., Speculation-led growth and fragility in Turkey: Does EU make a difference or “can it happen 
again”? No. 93, May 2006 
Onaran, Ö., Stockhammer, E.,  The effect of FDI and foreign trade on wages in the Central and Eastern 
European Countries in the post-transition era: A sectoral analysis.  No. 94, June 2006 
Burger, A.,  Reasons for the U.S. growth period in the nineties: non-keynesian effects, asset wealth and 
productivity. No. 95, July 2006 
Stockhammer, E., Is the NAIRU theory a Monetarist, New Keynesian, Post Keynesian or a Marxist theory? 
No. 96, March 2006 
Onaran, Ö., Aydiner-Avsar, N., The controversy over employment policy: Low labor costs and openness, or 
demand policy? A sectoral analysis for Turkey. No. 97, August 2006 
Klausinger, H., Oskar Morgenstern als wirtschaftspolitischer Berater in den 1930er-Jahren. No. 98, July 
2006 
Rocha-Akis, S., Labour tax policies and strategic offshoring under unionised oligopoly. No. 99, November 
2006 
Stockhammer, E., Onaran, Ö., National and sectoral factors in wage formation in Central and Eastern 
Europe. No. 100, December 2006 
Badinger, H., Kubin, I., Vom kurzfristigen zum mittelfristigen Gleichgewicht in einer offenen Volkswirtschaft 
unter fixen und flexiblen Wechselkursen. No. 101, January 2007 
Stockhammer, E., Onaran, Ö., Ederer, S., Functional income distribution and aggregate demand in the Euro-
area. No. 102, February 2007 
Onaran, Ö., Jobless growth in the Central and Eastern European Countries: A country specific panel data 
analysis for the manufacturing industry. No. 103, March 2007 
Stockhammer, E., Ramskogler, P., Uncertainty and exploitation in history. No. 104, April 2007 
Ramskogler, P., Uncertainty, market power and credit rationing. No. 105, August 2007 
Stockhammer, E., Ederer, S., Demand effects of the falling wage share in Austria. No. 106, August 2007 
Steidl, A., Stockhammer, E., Coming and leaving. Internal mobility in late Imperial Austria. No. 107, August 
2007. 
Onaran, Ö., International financial markets and fragility in the Eastern Europe: “can it happen” here? No. 
108, September 2007. 
Grandner, T., Product differentiation in a linear city and wage bargaining. No 109, September 2007. 
Hein, E., Stockhammer, E., Macroeconomic policy mix, employment and inflation in a Post-Keynesian 
alternative to the New Consensus Model. No. 110, October 2007 
Commendatore, P., Kubin, I., Petraglia, C., Footloose capital and productive public services. No. 111, 
October 2007 
Riedl, A., Rocha-Akis, S., Testing the tax competition theory: How elastic are national tax bases in western 
Europe? No. 112, November 2007 
Pufahl, A., Weiss, C., Evaluating the effects of farm programs: Results from propensity score. No. 113, 
November 2007 
Stockhammer, E., Hein, E., Grafl, L. Globalization and the effects of changes in functional income 
distribution on aggregate demand in Germany. No. 114, December 2007 
Smet, K. Stuck in the middle? The structure of trade between South Africa and its major trading partners. 
No. 115, December 2007 
Fellner, G., Sutter, M. Causes, consequences, and cures of myopic loss aversion – An experimental 
investigation. No. 116, January 2008 
Riedl, A. Contrasting the dynamic patterns of manufacturing and service FDI: Evidence from transition 
economies. No. 117, January 2008 
Onaran, Ö., The effect of foreign affiliate employment on wages, employment, and the wage share in 
Austria. No. 118, March 2008 
Onaran, Ö., The effect of import penetration on labor market outcomes in Austrian manufacturing industry. 
No. 119, March 2008 
Hein, E., Shareholder value orientation, distribution and growth – short- and medium-run effects in a 
Kaleckian model. No. 120, March 2008 
Figerl, J., Grandner, T. Job quality and wages in duopsony. No. 121, June 2008 
Fellner, G., Lünser, G. K. Cooperation in local and global groups. No. 122, July 2008 
Stockhammer, E., Grafl, L. Financial uncertainty and business investment. No. 123, August 2008 
Stockhammer, E., Ramskogler, P. Post Keynesian economics – how to move forward. No. 124, December 
2008 
 
 
 
 
